The Military and Information Warfare

Introduction

Generally speaking, a military with capacity but no means to use it cannot become a true combat power. If capacity is used to no effect, it will only cause unnecessary damage and waste and will not have practical significance to victory or defeat in the war. A military can become a truly effective combat power only if it can use its capacity effectively. Capacity utilization controlled by information technology can successfully solve this problem. In this way, the thrust of many of the worlds leading military nations military construction and development of weapons and equipment will no longer be toward strengthening the "firepower antipersonnel system" of the industrial age, but toward the strengthening of information technology, information weapons systems, and information networking. Today sights are not fixed on the firepower warfare of the industrial age, rather on the information warfare of this, the information age.

The military in the information age

The people's war of the past was conducted in tangible space, but information warfare, in addition to occurring in tangible space on the ground, on the sea, and in the air, is conducted even more in intangible space, such as in electromagnetic fields. It is not only a battlefield in which guns and bombs proliferate, but also a "computer battlefield" in sheltered laboratories and control rooms.

The key technologies in information warfare are remote-sensing technology, communications technology, and computer technology. Key information weapons include precision-guided weapons systems and electronic warfare weapons systems as well as C4I systems (communications, guidance, control, computers, and intelligence) which form the central nervous system. These hardware items are necessary and essential to adapt to and achieve victory in information warfare.

One of the main steps, and something many nations are now trying to implement, in becoming an efficient military at waging information warfare is bringing all branches of the military into an information network. Vital information and real - time communication may be shared on the network. WARnet Americas Navy's wide-area-relay network is just one example of an impressive military network.

WARnet is a wireless digital communications network that provides ship-to-shore and unit-to-unit connectivity in a 100-by-200-mile area of operations. The WARnet connections are made through a series of sea- and land-based mobile nodes and airborne radio relays. These links allow the same operational picture to be displayed in command centers aboard the Coronado offshore, in mobile command centers onshore and on computers carried by Marines engaged in combat. WARnet is transparent to its users, it dynamically reconfigures itself as the nodes move around the battle area. Airplanes, helicopters, ground vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) carry the nodes.

Information flows into the WARnet from a variety of sources: from a unit commander calling for fire on a handheld, to a battalion commander sending intelligence information via an instant message on his minicomputer, to enemy location information transmitted by a UAV. The epicenter of that data flow is an offshore headquarters referred to as the ECOC: experimental combat operations center. Here in a dimly lit, high-tech work center in the belly of the ship, the combat commander can gather information from across the battle space air, land and sea and make decisions based on the constantly changing elements of the operation.

While Marines on land have to make on-the-fly decisions about how to move and where to fire, the officers in the ECOC will often be able to see the enemy approaching before the ground unit does. Not only will they be able to share that information with them by entering it into the WARnet, they can anticipate the unit's needs by sending backup or aerial firepower even before it is requested.

Another example is the Army Knowledge Online portal (AKO). So called because it acts as a portal to hundreds of the Army's internal websites, servers and information sources. The network will have at its disposal 70 terabytes of storage. According to figures compiled by the Internet Archive, that's three times the size of the Library of Congress, the world's largest library. Despite the number of users, the heart of the AKO system is based on six servers and three document management servers. These nine machines act as a gateway to the Army's hundreds of existing computer systems and networks. Different versions of the various sites were developed and software automatically detects the type of connection in use and chooses the appropriate version of the website to be downloaded.

One example of how much information dictates the waging of war in this information age is the surprise attack on Libya by the United States. Before the attack, 18 electronic-warfare aircraft were sent to Libya to engage in powerful interference. Fighter aircraft were then sent to launch counterradiation guided missiles to destroy Libya's air defense radar stations, then fighter aircraft were sent to launch precision-guided bombs to attack five important targets. The information offensives in this raid included: 1) information reconnaissance to gain information on targets of the raid and to study the target in detail; 2) electronic interference to paralyze the opponent's communications and blind the opponent's air defense guided missiles; 3) information suppression by using counter radiation guided missiles to destroy air defense radar stations, and 4) information attack by using precision-guided warheads to attack pre-set targets.

During the Gulf War, the information offensives of the multilateral forces were even more representative. In addition to the four types listed above at least the following should be added: 1) Computer viruses were used to destroy the computer systems of Iraq's air defense system and thus paralyze it, and 2) stealth aircraft were used to launch precision-guided bombs against the communications building and the command center, thus achieving information suppression.

One must not forget that information warfare is conducted by people. Combat personnel must be familiar with the technical and strategic aspects of the weapons and equipment in their hands and must be very well versed in the operation of those weapons and equipment. They must be able to understand accurately the combat plan and resolutely and flexibly utilize weapons and equipment to wipe out the enemy.

However the combat personnel of information warfare are not only the warriors who charge enemy lines for face to face struggles of life or death, but sometimes are the operating technical personnel who sit before computers and instruments. They stand at the first line in electronic warfare and in the resistance against C4I systems and on the front line in information technology conflicts.

Increased information flow may be necessary to ensure victory in the battlefield but it is not sufficient, nor is it risk free. As information flow increases, staff may drown in data while their commanders thirst for information. One analysist put the problem this way: While up-to-date technical means of communication and data processing are absolutely vital to the conduct of modern war in all its forms, they will not in themselves suffice for the creation of a functioning command system, and they may, if understanding and proper usage are not achieved, constitute part of the disease they are supposed to cure. [van Creveld]. One example of this is the reported case in Desert Storm were a Joint Forces commander received 1.3 million messages within 24 hours. It would seem that information warfare still holds many problem that have not yet been resolved.